The Australian government’s 2026 National Defence Strategy and accompanying Integrated Investment Program, released last week, reaffirm the centrality of maritime power to Canberra’s defence posture but leave key capability and funding questions unresolved. The documents are presented as the next step in implementing the government’s 2023 “strategy of denial” — described in the strategy as a defensive approach “designed to stop an adversary from succeeding in its goal to coerce states through force, or the threatened use of force, to achieve dominance” — but critics and observers say the papers still do not close several important gaps.
The 2026 Strategy deliberately distinguishes a strategy of denial from narrow sea denial, arguing that restricting an adversary’s freedom of manoeuvre, as occurs in places such as the Black Sea or the Strait of Hormuz, does not in itself guarantee Australia’s own freedom of manoeuvre. The new strategy commits the Australian Defence Force to protect critical sea lines of communication in cooperation with allies and partners, and expands the concept of maritime strategy to include defence industry policy and supply-chain resilience — including efforts to reduce the volume of critical goods that must move by sea.
Maritime capabilities dominate the Integrated Investment Program. Maritime-related priorities account for roughly 41 per cent of the overall investment profile, and the program lists 11 capability priorities for the integrated force, many with a clear maritime focus: undersea warfare to project force and maintain situational awareness; sea denial and localised sea control to deny access and enable ADF freedom of action; and amphibious operations supported by improved targeting and strike capabilities. The documents also explicitly assign localised sea control tasks to the surface combatant fleet of frigates and destroyers.
A central plank of the investment plan remains the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangement. The program also escalates emphasis on extra-large and large uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), naming systems such as Ghost Shark and Speartooth. While many technical details remain classified, the papers highlight likely intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike roles for these UUVs and suggest they will help bridge capability shortfalls between the ageing Collins-class conventional submarines and future Virginia-class nuclear submarines.
The 2026 Integrated Investment Program marks a notable expansion in the definition of maritime capability. Unlike the 2024 edition, the new documents give renewed attention to hydrography and mine warfare — areas previously overlooked — and identify seabed warfare as an area of increasing focus where autonomy and UUVs may be important. But the added specificity does not translate into concrete delivery plans. The investment program repeats earlier shortfalls: there is still no clear, comprehensive funding plan to close identified capability gaps, and much of the government’s approach leans on the promise of autonomy and uncrewed systems without explaining how budgetary or industrial constraints will be overcome.
That gap between strategy and resourcing underscores the documents’ central tension: Canberra has articulated what it wants the integrated force to do at sea, and has prioritised maritime capabilities accordingly, but it has not fully explained how those capabilities will be delivered or how maritime defence will be coordinated across government to protect long sea lines of communication. The 2026 papers move the debate forward by naming systems and broad priorities, but whether those plans will translate into sustained capability improvement — particularly in undersea and seabed domains — remains to be seen.