Ministerial roles play a significant part in the clientelist political landscape of Papua New Guinea. For parliamentarians aiming for re-election, serving as a minister can provide essential resources to garner voter support, alongside enhancing their local status and influence at the national level. From the viewpoint of prime ministers and the current government, these appointments are strategic, rewarding loyal MPs and ensuring stable coalitions among various parties and independents.
This raises the question: How beneficial is it to hold a ministerial position, and does this benefit vary across different elections, seats, and types of ministries? Using comprehensive data on elections in Papua New Guinea, recent research employs a difference-in-difference event study approach to analyze these aspects, resulting in three primary conclusions.
The first finding is that, in open electorates, holding a ministerial position boosts an MP’s chances of re-election, albeit temporarily. Research shows that newly appointed ministers see a 14.4 percentage point increase in re-election likelihood in their first election after their appointment. This initial advantage is notable given that the average re-election rate for incumbents from 1977 to 2017 was only 45%. However, this ministerial advantage fades by the subsequent election, even if the MP continues in ministerial roles.
This outcome may seem counterintuitive, as one might expect that longer ministerial tenure would lead to more substantial support. However, it’s possible that increased expectations from supporters cannot be met over time, leading to diminishing returns. Additionally, prolonged visibility could result in heightened scrutiny of an MP’s performance, potentially influencing voter behavior adversely. Furthermore, a minister might become more engrossed in national issues, neglecting local matters crucial for their constituents.
The second point highlights that, for incumbents in provincial seats, being a minister does not confer any electoral advantage when seeking re-election. Unlike open electorates, no significant correlation exists between ministerial status and re-election success in provincial contexts. This may be attributed to a PNG law stipulating that MPs in provincial seats must resign as governors if they take on ministerial positions. Given the influential roles of governors within provincial governance, the benefits of ministerial appointments appear insufficient to justify forfeiting the title and related advantages.
The final finding reveals that the type of ministry one holds greatly impacts re-election prospects. Senior ministerial roles tend to offer more substantial benefits compared to junior ministries. Holding a position such as Prime Minister or a minister within a central agency can significantly enhance an MP’s appeal for re-election. Conversely, junior ministers may have negligible differences in electoral success compared to backbenchers during their first election. Moreover, if they remain in a junior role for two terms without progressing to a senior position, their chances for re-election could diminish by 25-30 percentage points in comparison to MPs who are not ministers.
Overall, these insights underscore the intricate dynamics of ministerial positions in Papua New Guinea’s political arena. While these positions hold strategic importance, their advantages vary significantly across election types, constituency seats, and the nature of ministries held. Consequently, the perceived benefits of being a minister should not be presumed as guaranteed.