Ministerial positions in Papua New Guinea (PNG) play a significant role in the nation’s clientelist politics. For parliamentarians aiming for re-election, holding a ministerial role can access vital resources to garner voter support, while also bestowing local prestige and national influence. From the perspective of prime ministers and ruling parties, these appointments serve as a means to reward parliamentary support and maintain coalition stability among independents and various political factions.
The question arises: how beneficial is it to be a minister? And does this benefit vary across different elections, constituencies, and types of ministries? Utilizing comprehensive data on elections and ministerial roles in PNG, this analysis employs a difference-in-difference event study approach to draw insights.
The first notable finding is that in open electorates, being a minister initially enhances an MP’s chances of re-election, though this advantage is temporary. Specifically, a minister in an open electorate sees a 14.4 percentage point increase in re-election likelihood during the election immediately following their appointment. This is significant given that, on average, only 45% of incumbent parliamentarians were re-elected from 1977 to 2017. However, this ministerial advantage diminishes by the second election following their appointment, even if the MP retains their ministerial role.
This trend may reflect increasing expectations from supporters that can become challenging to meet over time. Extended visibility in the public eye might also subject MPs to greater scrutiny, potentially altering voter behavior against them. Furthermore, an MP’s focus on national politics and policy matters may draw attention away from local issues—detrimental in a clientelist system.
The second point highlights that for provincial seats, being a minister does not confer an electoral advantage. Unlike open electorates, incumbents in provincial seats show no significant re-election benefits from holding ministerial positions. This may stem from existing laws in PNG that require parliamentarians in provincial constituencies to relinquish their governorship upon becoming a minister, thereby diminishing any potential benefits from ministerial roles.
Lastly, the nature of the ministry held also plays a critical role in re-election prospects. Junior ministries appear less beneficial—and even detrimental in the long run—compared to senior positions. While being prime minister or part of a central agency typically enhances influence and resource availability, junior ministers may find their re-election prospects similar to those of backbenchers for their first term. Notably, if junior ministers do not ascend to a higher position, they may be 25-30 percentage points less likely to be re-elected after two terms compared to non-ministers.
Collectively, these findings underscore the complex dynamics of ministerial roles in PNG’s political landscape. The advantages tied to these positions significantly vary depending on the electoral context, constituency type, and ministry category, reinforcing the notion that such benefits should not be taken for granted.
Alyssa Leng will share her research findings during Session 2A at the PNG Update on August 21-22 at the University of Papua New Guinea’s Waigani campus. Organized by UPNG’s School of Business and Public Policy and ANU’s Development Policy Centre, this annual event is free to the public without prior registration required.