Ministerial roles play a significant part in the clientelist politics of Papua New Guinea, offering parliamentarians seeking re-election access to resources for voter support, as well as providing local prestige and national influence. For prime ministers and current governments, these appointments serve to reward parliamentary members and maintain balanced coalitions among independents and various parties.
This situation raises crucial questions about the advantages of being a minister and whether these advantages fluctuate across elections, constituencies, and types of ministries. Utilizing extensive data on elections and ministerial roles in Papua New Guinea, a recent study employs a difference-in-difference event study design to explore these questions, revealing three important findings.
Firstly, in open electorates, parliamentarians who are ministers initially experience a boost to their re-election prospects, though this advantage is fleeting. The study finds that being appointed as a minister increases an MP’s chances of re-election in the immediate election following their appointment by 14.4 percentage points. However, this ministerial incumbency effect diminishes by the second election after their appointment, even if they remain in ministerial roles. This temporary advantage may be surprising; one might expect that extended ministerial tenure would continue to yield electoral benefits in a clientelist system. However, increased expectations from supporters and potential scrutiny of the minister’s performance may lead to shifts in voter behavior. Additionally, a minister’s focus on national policies might detract from attention to local issues critical for re-election.
Secondly, the influence of being a minister does not appear to provide an advantage for incumbents in provincial seats. Unlike open electorates, there is no statistically significant impact on the chances of re-election for ministers in these constituencies. A contributing factor may be a law in Papua New Guinea that mandates MPs in provincial seats to relinquish their governor roles if they become ministers. Given the significant influence governors wield locally, this trade-off may not present sufficient benefits from ministerial roles.
Thirdly, the type of ministry held plays a crucial role in influencing re-election prospects, with junior ministries generally having less favorable outcomes for parliamentarians. Not all ministerial positions carry the same weight; for example, serving as Prime Minister or holding a central agency or economic portfolio tends to offer significant resources and influence, unlike junior roles. The study observes that junior ministers may face worse re-election prospects if they fail to advance to more senior positions after serving two terms, facing a 25-30 percentage point decrease in chances of re-election compared to non-ministers.
Overall, these findings underscore the complex nature of ministerial roles in Papua New Guinea’s political landscape, indicating that the benefits of being a minister can significantly vary across different elections, constituencies, and types of ministries.