Ministerial positions play a significant role in the clientelist politics of Papua New Guinea, offering parliamentarians an avenue to garner voter support and attain local prestige and national influence. For prime ministers and existing governments, appointing ministers serves as a means to reward parliamentary members for their loyalty and maintain balanced coalitions among independents and various parties.
A recent analysis sheds light on the advantages of being a minister in terms of re-election prospects, utilizing extensive election and ministerial data available for Papua New Guinea. Three primary findings emerge from this study.
Firstly, in open electorates, serving as a minister initially boosts the re-election chances of an MP, but this advantage is temporary. The study indicates that a minister in an open electorate experiences a 14.4 percentage point increase in their likelihood of re-election immediately after their appointment. However, this advantage diminishes by the second election following their appointment, even if the MP continues to serve in a ministerial role. This finding challenges the expectation that long-term resource access and influence would lead to sustained electoral benefits, suggesting that heightened expectations from voters and increased scrutiny over time may negate these advantages.
Secondly, for MPs in provincial seats, holding a ministerial position does not seem to provide an electoral edge when seeking re-election. Unlike open electorates, the data shows no significant effect on the re-election prospects for incumbents in provincial seats. This may be attributed to statutory requirements in Papua New Guinea that necessitate parliamentarians in provincial seats to resign from their governor positions when appointed as ministers, leading to a loss of significant local influence that outweighs any benefits gained from ministerial status.
Lastly, the type of ministry held impacts re-election chances. Not all ministerial roles are equal in terms of resource access and reputational benefits. Higher-profile positions, such as Prime Minister or heads of central agencies, generally confer greater advantages than junior ministerial roles. The analysis reveals that junior ministers often share similar re-election prospects with backbenchers during their first election but face a 25-30 percentage point decrease in their odds of re-election if they do not transition to a more senior role after holding a junior position for two terms.
Overall, the findings emphasize the nuanced impact of ministerial roles on electoral success, varying across different elections, parliamentary seats, and types of ministries. As such, the supposed advantages of being a minister should not be assumed without consideration of these factors.