Ministerial roles play a significant part in the clientelist political landscape of Papua New Guinea. For parliamentarians aiming for re-election, holding a ministerial position can provide access to resources that help garner voter support, along with an increase in local prestige and national influence. From the standpoint of prime ministers and current governments, these appointments are a way to reward parliamentary support and maintain fragile coalitions involving independents and various parties.
This raises inquiries into the actual advantages of being a minister and whether these advantages differ across elections, constituencies, and ministry types. Utilizing extensive data on elections and ministers in Papua New Guinea, I assess these questions through a difference-in-difference event study approach in a recent discussion paper. Here are three key insights.
First, in open electorates, being a minister initially boosts an MP’s chances of re-election, but this benefit is temporary. I discovered that an MP in an open electorate has a 14.4 percentage point higher likelihood of being re-elected in the election immediately following their ministerial appointment. This effect is substantial, given that only 45% of incumbent parliamentarians returned to parliament from 1977 to 2017 on average in Papua New Guinea. However, this electoral advantage diminishes by the subsequent election even if the MP continues to serve as a minister.
This outcome is somewhat surprising, as one might expect that prolonged access to resources and reputation building would yield electoral benefits, especially in a clientelist political framework. However, as time goes on, supporters’ expectations may rise, rendering the MP’s ability to meet these expectations more challenging. Extended visibility could also lead to increased scrutiny of an MP’s performance, potentially altering voter behavior. Furthermore, a minister’s focus on national-level issues might detract from local constituency concerns, adversely impacting re-election prospects.
Second, for incumbents in provincial seats, holding a ministerial position does not appear to enhance their re-election chances. Unlike open electorates, being a minister does not significantly affect the odds of re-election for incumbents in provincial seats. This could be attributed to a law in Papua New Guinea that requires MPs in provincial seats to resign from their governor positions upon being appointed as a minister. Governors already wield considerable influence at the provincial level, which may outweigh any perceived advantages of being a minister.
Third, the specific type of ministry held is important; junior ministries tend to be less beneficial, particularly over the long term, for re-election prospects. Different ministries have varying levels of value, and being a Prime Minister, for example, offers more significant resources and influence compared to other positions. Analysis reveals that serving as a junior minister may not provide any advantage over remaining a backbencher, especially in the first election. Furthermore, junior ministers are about 25-30 percentage points less likely to be re-elected after holding that role for two terms compared to MPs who are not ministers.
Overall, these findings underscore the significance of ministerial roles in Papua New Guinea’s political dynamics, as recognized by local politicians and analysts. However, it is crucial to understand that the advantages associated with being a minister can vary considerably depending on the electoral context, the nature of the seats, and the types of ministries involved. Therefore, the presumed benefits of a ministerial appointment should not be overly generalized.
Alyssa Leng will present her findings in Session 2A on the opening day of the PNG Update, scheduled for August 21-22 at the University of Papua New Guinea’s Waigani campus. This annual event, organized by the UPNG’s School of Business and Public Policy alongside the ANU’s Development Policy Centre, is free to attend and does not require prior registration.